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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the work of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, Fund, and UN
Family organizations in ensuring stability and development in underdeveloped and developing
countries during post-conflict situations. This work defines and examines peacebuilding and
development using data from the PBC, PBF, Polity IV, the Human Development Index Report,
and other sources, including UN documents. Three case studies where chosen to evaluate the
effectiveness of peacebuilding missions in accordance with the PBC priorities: Sierra Leone,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Central African Republic. The UN work has contributed to development in
these cases; however, improvements were needed in some areas as stability and one of the main
peacebuilding objectives -prevention of war recurrence- were not successfully established.
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Chapter One: Introduction

In the aftermath of violent conflicts, many countries become unstable, unable to ensure
strong governance, and are at risk of conflicts recurring. In order to maintain peace in countries
worldwide, the United Nations (UN) along with its agencies, funds, and programs, like the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the refugee agency, etc. assist in conducting
peacebuilding operations. Peacebuilding is the process that consists of programs to establish
durable peace and prevent the recurrence of violence in a country by addressing and eradicating
the root causes of the conflict. This is done through reconciliation, the creation of societal and
local structures to peacefully manage conflict, efforts to build inclusive institutions and good
governance as well as improving the economy. Peacebuilding operations have become an
important tool for maintaining peace, providing stability, and ensuring the reintegration of
former combatants. Hence, peacebuilding operations are mostly needed in underdeveloped and
developing countries. Nevertheless, the level of effectiveness of these operations is contestable.
While some missions have been considered successful by the United Nations (Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire), many more have been ineffective or non-ending. The UN
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is the main entity that has been at the forefront of
peacebuilding missions; as a result, via the examination of the work conducted by this
commission, this thesis will address the central question: to what extent do peacebuilding
operations contribute to the stability of underdeveloped and developing countries in post-conflict
situations? This question will serve as a guide to understanding and evaluating the successes and
failures of peacebuilding, the amount of work that has been conducted to stabilize countries that
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have undergone peacebuilding, and designing possible policy recommendations to increase
peacebuilding missions’ effectiveness. The literature and available qualitative and quantitative
data will be utilized in this process. Three developing countries where peacebuilding missions
have taken place will be evaluated. The research will examine pre-conflict and post-conflict
conditions in order to establish levels of development prior to the outbreak of conflict compared
to development growth attributed to UN peacebuilding efforts, drawing on data related to the
Human Development Index (HDI). Moreover, peacebuilding funding, program duration, and the
quality of assistance at the judicial, political, structural, social, and economic levels would be
examined. Data will be collected using online databases, the United Nations and the
Peacebuilding Commission's dataset, Polity IV democracy or authority trends index, and the
State and Peace-building Fund (SPF) annual reports. In accordance with the central question of
this thesis, I hypothesize that peacebuilding missions are necessary yet frequently fail to respond
to the long-term political, social, and economic stability of underdeveloped and developing
countries in post-conflict situations.
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Chapter Two: Defining Peacebuilding

In the field of peace studies, in 1975, Johan Galtung was the first scholar to use the term
peacebuilding (Peacebuilding Initiative, 2008). Galtung envisioned the creation of a structure
that would go beyond peacemaking and peacekeeping; this structure would create a mechanism
that would eliminate the causes of war and provide alternatives in war like situations
(Peacebuilding Initiative, 2008). Galtung’s work was later expanded by other scholars including
John Paul Lederach who saw peacebuilding as a tool for a peaceful “conflict transformation”
(Peacebuilding Initiative, 2008). At the United Nations, the concept of peacebuilding was
introduced in 1992 by the Secretary-General (SG), Boutros Boutros-Ghali (United Nations
Peacebuilding Funds, 2019; Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The SG defined peacebuilding as the action to
identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid
a relapse into conflict; it is also a counterpart to preventive diplomacy (United Nations
Peacebuilding Funds, 2019; Boutros-Ghali, 1992 para. 55-57). In 2000, the Brahimi Report
expanded on this definition asserting that peacebuilding consisted of, “Activities undertaken on
the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building
on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (United Nations
Peacebuilding Funds, 2019). Furthermore, in 2007, SG Ban Ki-moon’s Policy Committee
asserted that peacebuilding was:
A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the
foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be
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coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow
set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives (United Nations Peacebuilding
Funds, 2019).

Based on all these definitions, it can be implied that war prevention and the promotion of
peace are the main goals of peacebuilding. Yet, the development component of peacebuilding
missions plays a critical role in ensuring peace and preventing war. Due to the disastrous
consequences of war, especially considering human casualties, the concept of “human security”
has emerged as another driving aspect of peacebuilding. Hence, many humanitarian international
organizations feel the responsibility to promote and conduct peacebuilding operations
(Peacebuilding Initiative, 2008). Nevertheless, in this thesis, I will focus on the work of the
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).
The UN General Assembly and the Security Council, in resolutions A/RES/60/180 and
S/RES/1645 in 2005, established the Peacebuilding Commission (United Nations Peacebuilding,
2019). The PBC’s mandate consisted of mobilizing and serving as a connecting platform for all
actors, providing strategy, ensuring sustainable development in countries in need of
peacebuilding (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2019). In 2009, the SG reestablished the order of
peacebuilding priorities in post-conflict. In resolutions A/63/881–S/2009/304,
A/64/866–S/2010/386, and A/67/499-S/2012/746, the priorities were set as follows:
-

Support to basic safety and security

-

Political processes

-

Provision of basic services

-

Restoration of core government functions

7

-

Economic revitalization.
There was also an emphasis on the role of women in peacebuilding in resolution

A/65/354–S/2010/466 (Peacebuilding Fund 2019). In a 2012 report, these priorities were
reiterated as part of PBC’s goals with an emphasis on inclusive politics, effective economy,
access to justice, and employment generation and livelihoods support (Peacebuilding Fund
2019). Although the PBC does not provide a clear definition of peacebuilding, the commission
has made multiple attempts to ensure peacebuilding missions’ effectiveness. The latest approach
to effective peacebuilding was the GA and SC’s review of the peacebuilding architecture; in
resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016), the PBC functions were laid out:
(a) To bring sustained international attention to sustaining peace, and to provide political
accompaniment and advocacy to countries affected by conflict, with their consent;
(b) To promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding, noting
that security, development and human rights are closely interlinked and mutually
reinforcing;
(c) To serve a bridging role among the principal organs and relevant entities of the
United Nations by sharing advice on peacebuilding needs and priorities, in line with the
respective competencies and responsibilities of these bodies;
(d) To serve as a platform to convene all relevant actors within and outside the United
Nations, including from Member States, national authorities, United Nations missions
and country teams, international, regional and subregional organizations, international
financial institutions, civil society, women’s groups, youth organizations and, where
relevant, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to provide
recommendations and information to improve their coordination, to develop and share
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good practices in peacebuilding, including on institution-building, and to ensure
predictable financing to peacebuilding (United Nations Peacebuilding, 2019).

In accordance with the above PBC goals and priorities and the implications that war
prevention and peace are the main objectives of peacebuilding, this thesis will evaluate the
effectiveness of the commission.
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Chapter Three: Literature Review

In 2005, many actors engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in order to
stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. The country received delegations from Canada, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (US/USA) (Mizuta, 2008 p.1). These
delegations worked along with the UN and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The
objective of these actors was to ensure the country’s post-conflict development by rebuilding
security, institutions, trust, the rule of law, and order in the country. These delegations and actors
conducted peacebuilding programs using Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) —unique
operations designed to deal with three aspects of peacebuilding: governance, security and
development— (Mizuta, 2008 p.1).
In his approach to understanding the effectiveness of peacebuilding, Mizuta (2008, p.13),
concluded that PRTs are an important “transitional arrangement” that can fill the gap between
stability and development. The PRT approach consisted of having military and non-military
personnel assist populations and collaboratively work with the Afghan government (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense) regarding all peacebuilding activities. The PRTs’
military component was created to facilitate stability while the civil component implemented
development activities in order to win the hearts and minds of the locals for short-term stability
and build governance and economic structures for long-term stability. These PRTs proceeded by
first implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). QIPs were set to respond to immediate needs
of local populations. Out of all the countries that assisted in Afghanistan, Sweden was the only
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country that did not implement QIPs because they came in late in Afghanistan, March 2006, to
replace the British (Mizuta, 2008 p.9 & 12). The Swedish work consisted of coordinating and
serving as a liaison between the aid community in the Mazar-e-Sharif region and the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to restore order (Mizuta, 2008 p.9).
Second, PRTs did not carry out long-term reconstruction activities because their main
objective was to provide quick and short-term assistance to people in order to improve security
(Mizuta, 2008 p.12). However, according to Mizuta, reconstruction assistance should constitute
two categories: quick projects that can be operational within three weeks or so, but may lose
their utility in a couple of years and development projects that may take up to five years to
complete but will remain intact for decades. Afghanistan needed both of these types of projects.
Hence, it was unlikely for PRTs to be effective without engaging in mid to long-term
development. Although all nations were aware of these two reconstruction categories and had
development advisors or coordinators in Afghanistan, only the UK and the US attempted to
establish projects that aimed to promote mid or long-term development (Mizuta, 2008 p.12-13).
When evaluating PRTs’ effectiveness, McNerney (2006) found in his work that they were a
necessary and driving force to stability in Afghanistan; however, many improvements could be
done and there should not be a one-size-fits-all scheme (referring to Kosovo and Haiti) as every
country or case is different.
Another approach to examining peacebuilding by Sudebi (2013) emphasized that the role
of the private sector should be considered in regard to peacebuilding. Although the behavior and
attitude of the private sector do not reflect united approaches, its heterogeneous nature takes into
consideration various needs, interests, and positions aimed at furthering peace and preventing
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conflict (Sudebi, 2013 p.183). Even though the profit-driven structure of the private sector may
exacerbate competition (especially economically) that detrimentally affects the poor in
post-conflict situations. private investment is motivated by self-interests and is self-regulated
which can be a valuable tool in harnessing pro-peace business behavior if there is international
community support and oversight (Sudebi, 2013 p.181). But if not overseen, the private sector
can exploit vulnerable people. Based on his work on peacebuilding in Nepal, the author asserted
that:
If a pro-peace entrepreneur receives external facilitation, interaction and support, its
ability to contribute to local peace initiatives can be amplified significantly. Unlike a
conflict profiteer, a pro-peace entrepreneur can support and help regenerate local
economic activities; can adopt [Corporate Social Responsibility] CSR as a tool to
improve the negative public perception of business; can use the work place as a space for
bridging the community divide; and can offer jobs for ex-combatants, [Internally
Displaced People] IDPs, youths, and conflict-affected families (Sudebi, 2013 p.202).

The jobs created by the private sector can help redress socio-economic exclusion, which
fueled and has been fueling multiple conflicts, especially in the Nepalese case (Sudebi, 2013
p.202). Hence, the private sector became the bridge reducing or eliminating the gap between
business and the local communities (Sudebi, 2013 p.202).
The claim that the private sector can contribute to peacebuilding is further explained by
public–private partnerships for local development and peace. These partnerships are essential for
community security or policing, youth entrepreneurship development, and creating vocations for
conflict-affected communities (Sudebi. 2013 p.198). Despite this optimism regarding the role of
the private sector in peacebuilding, in the Nepalese case, the private sector’s employee
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recruitment processes lacked transparency and was heavily based on personal networks, hence
increasing public discontent (Sudebi, 2013 p.200). Additionally, private employers were hiring
increasing numbers of employees from India to avoid politicized labor tensions. Lastly, these
businesses profited massively from illicit business activities such as tax evasion, cross-border
illegal trade drugs and fertilizers, black marketing, smuggling of timber products, etc.).
Another important element of peacebuilding, according to Reilly (2013), is political
parties. Reilly (2013, p.89) asserted that political parties are one of the primary avenues for
building an accountable and responsive model of democracy as their objectives are to represent
political constituencies and interests, recruit and socialize new candidates for office, set policy
making agendas, integrate disparate groups and individuals into the democratic process, and
form the basis of stable political coalitions and governments.
Party leaders and the international community should consider the positive aspects of
political parties in order to promote stability and effective peacebuilding missions. In most
post-conflict cases, the common mistake by party leaders has been seeking unity or cohesion to
sway voters in their favor; this has caused collective action problems (Reilly, 2013 p.100). This
approach generated weak polities and parties which were unable to make political decisions
(Reilly, 2013 p.100). Instead, parties should be formed considering salient issues. Moreover, the
international community should prioritize effective governance and economic development when
decisions on political institutions and parties are made. Reilley (2013, p.100), joined by the UN
and other elites, believed that setting a hyper-representative political structure could be a
retrograde for development.
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Drawing on the work of Lederach, Ramsbotham et al (2005, p.216 as cited by Fulcher,
2012) identified four key areas to be addressed by peace builders: political stabilization, physical
safety, economic growth, and psychological healing. Peace education, another component of
peacebuilding by Fulcher (2012), intersects with these four areas through its attention to
children’s own reflections on conflicts, representation, and capacity or community building.
Peace education can serve to support and protect children in the process of peacebuilding by
teaching them skills and concepts which they can draw upon when faced with new conflict or
when dealing with the aftermath of past conflict.
Although this thesis focuses on post-conflict situations, Shamsie’s (2008) work
concerning the effectiveness of development approaches to reduce poverty and inequality in
Haiti provides important insight into peacebuilding. Haiti has never had a war, nevertheless the
political, humanitarian, and economic situation in Haiti called for international solutions
(Shamsie, 2008 p.414). The political structure of the country was the most conflicted area.
Regardless of multiple peacebuilding efforts, Haiti remained at risk of falling back into conflict
(Shamsie, 2008 p.414). The neo-liberal ideas that underpinned the first peacebuilding exercise in
1994, which did not reduce poverty, continued to dominate Haiti’s development and
reconstruction efforts. There is continuous belief that liberalization will generate social benefits,
despite the fact that trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s proved to be disastrous for small
producers, significantly worsened poverty and inequality in Haiti (Shamsie, 2008 p.426).
In 2004, after President Aristide was forced into exile, the Haitian interim government
put in place the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) and the Interim-Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (I-PRSP) (Shamsie, 2008 p.420). The ICF and I-PRSP emphasized social
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protection and more funds were assigned to public welfare and poverty reduction (Shamsie, 2008
p.420). Moreover, the World Bank recommended greater investments in education to stimulate
economic growth in accordance with the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) documents, which
stressed the importance of long-term investment in education, health, and social policy in Haiti
(Shamsie, 2018 p.426). Nevertheless, long-term results were still hard to achieve as relevant
elements to address poverty and inequality were still missing. Greater attention to the
distributional impact of macro-economic policies (market-oriented policies of liberalization and
privatization) were needed since research has shown that free markets tend to reward the rich and
discriminate against the poor (Shamsie, 2008 p.426).
In order for Haitians to believe that their state has shed its original purpose, —which was
to enrich a small group of elites and protect them from the rest of society through social,
economic, and political exclusion—, policies that move beyond the creation of ‘economic
opportunity’ need to be implemented (Shamsie, 2008). Employment creation and the protection
of small peasant producers, according to Turner and Pugh (as cited by Shamsie, 2008 p.426),
would be a step in the right direction. The social hierarchy that exist in the country needs to be
broken down.
Based on a 2010 Note to the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the work of the UN to
fully fund Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs has been limited
due to lack of funds; donors have become more hesitant to fund political and security matters.
Even though DDR is an important factor of peacebuilding, humanitarian issues receive more
money. Such decisions affect nations in need. For instance, in 2010, Sudan’s elections were
affected by the lack of funding as the country (along with the UN, the Government of National
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Unity, and the Government of South Sudan) was unable to implement a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) before elections. This agreement aimed to reintegrate ex-combatants and
increase the likelihood for a peaceful referendum (Note to Secretary General, 2010).
Moreover, the 2010 Progress Report of the Secretary-General emphasized the ability of
the UN and the international community to support national efforts to secure sustainable peace
rapidly, effectively, ensure coordination, and civilian deployment capabilities and financing
(Progress Report of the Secretary-General, 2010 p.1). According to Vijay Nambiar, the
Secretary-General’s Chief of Staff, there was no improvement compared to his previous report
concerning peacebuilding (Progress Report of the Secretary-General, 2010 p.1). This report notes
the importance of countries in peacebuilding as they are the primary parties responsible for the
effectiveness of these reconstruction programs while recognizing the critical role of the UN and
the international community in support of national agendas.
This Report sets out an agenda announcing areas of improvement concerning
peacebuilding: stronger leadership on the ground was needed, more effective strategies and
planning, better coordination between the headquarters and the team on the ground for better
delivery, predictable deployment of civilian capacities was needed, more productive UN-World
Bank engagement, further national ownership, and strengthen national capacity development and
improve peacebuilding financing (Progress Report of the Secretary-General, 2010 p.2). Changes
have been made in areas such as leadership, civilian capacity, finance, and system coherence
(Progress Report of the Secretary-General, 2010 p.2-3). However, in the remaining cited areas,
many improvements were still needed. Concerning assessment, planning, and strategy, the UN
needs to be able to agree rapidly on a common approach that would address immediate national
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priorities (Progress Report of the Secretary-General, 2010 p.5 & 6). For instance, in cases of
unconstitutional change in government, an interdepartmental group should determine a strategic
response within 24 hours; issues such as national capacity, subnational, local, and women’s
involvement should be considered (Progress Report of the Secretary-General, 2010 p.7; Report
of the Secretary-General on Women, 2010). This Report emphasized on having a clear and more
effective response when designing and implementing peacebuilding programs. A later report in
the same year included a concrete agenda setting a framework of how peacebuilding operations
should be conducted.
The above literature has provided in depth knowledge allowing a better analysis of
peacebuilding programs. An agenda to improve peacebuilding programs has also been provided.
Hence, this thesis will expand on the literature by evaluating the progress since the proposed
agenda, looking at how peacebuilding has been conducted in some countries, and providing
recommendations, especially in regard to designing the rule of law, if necessary. In addition,
exclusive access to the Ban Ki-moon papers project will add extensively to the existing
literature.
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Chapter Four: Sierra Leone

The 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone was one of the most devastating wars of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century. With a population of 4.2 million at the time of conflict,
the country had one million internally displaced people, 500,000 people became refugees,
400,000 survived after amputation, and thousands were killed, raped, mutilated, or became child
soldiers (Schocken, 2002 p.1). This civil war was the result of the attempt to overthrow Joseph
Momoh’s government by Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with support from the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of Charles Taylor (former president of Liberia) (Gberie, 2010
p.33). This war that was conducted with the aim of overthrowing an unjust dictator turned into a
race to exploit the country’s diamond reserves. It also contributed to the destruction of more than
half of the country’s infrastructure (Gberie, 2010 p.35).
The 1999 peace agreement signed in Lomé, Togo, between the government and the RUF
led to the cessation of the war in January 2002 (Schocken, 2002 p.1). This agreement gave full
amnesty to the RUF and its leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, allowed the creation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and also allowed the Creation of the Special Court of Sierra
Leone (SCSL) after a UN agreement on January 16, 2002 (Schocken, 2002 p.1; Jackson, 2015
p.39).
In addition to mass killings and many humanitarian crimes and atrocities, Sierra Leone’s
political, judicial, economic, and social aspects were also tremendously impacted or destroyed by
this war. Hence, any attempt to rebuilding the country and reestablishing peace required many
efforts especially considering the displaced population, rebuilding infrastructure, small villages,
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government ministries, and the judicial sector (with prosecutions and reestablishing the rule of
law). Importantly, the shattered economy had to be rebuilt from the ground up, and revenues
siphoned off by the RUF blood diamond industry brought back under government control.
Prior to the civil war, Sierra Leone was unstable, especially politically with corruption,
multiple arrests of high-ranking officials, and the attempted coup d’etat of 1987. Due to the lack
of data, analyzing development in Sierra Leone cannot be undertaken by comparing the country
pre-and post-civil war. Instead, development will be analyzed by looking at the progress of the of
the country in a 10 year framework during and after the civil war. Moreover, the work done by
the UN and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) peacebuilders, reported in the UN Human
Development Reports, will portray development trends.

Retrieved from Polity IV

19

Sierra Leone was one of the first peacebuilding operations taken up by the UN. Hence,
many efforts were conducted to ensure success. For instance, the SCSL set certain precedents for
both Sierra Leone and the international community as it was one of the first instances where
cases were tried regarding gender-based crimes, child soldiers, war crimes by individuals in
leadership positions (Jackson, 2015 p.41). Moreover,
It was the first to receive the specific mandate to prosecute people who bore the most
responsibility for serious crimes; the first to sit in the place where those crimes were
committed; the first to be overseen by a management committee of independent
member states; the first to provide some scope for the appointment of local officials;
and the first to be funded voluntarily by member states of the UN. In legal terms, it also
set a number of important precedents, including establishment of a principal defender
to ensure a fair defense, an outreach office, and a Legacy Phase Working Group to
assure a lasting legacy for the court. In addition, the SCSL was the first body to sit
alongside a truth and reconciliation process (Jackson, 2015 p.41).

Additionally, Sierra Leone received assistance from the United Nations for the 2002
presidential elections (and the later 2007 parliamentary elections) (Bindi & Tufekci, 2018
p.1162). Another impactful contribution in this case was from civil society groups. Professionals,
trade unions, religious groups, human rights groups, and economic interest- based groups have
been very active in promoting gender equality, women’s increased participation in politics, peace
and reconciliation, religious harmony between Muslims and Christians, and played a key role in
the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) process (Belloni,
2001 as cited in Bindi & Tufekci, 2018 p.1164). For instance, the Inter-Religious Council of
Sierra Leone, in addition to ensuring religious harmony, “Engaged in a series of programs in
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education, reconciliation, reintegration of ex-combatants, and consultation with the head of
warring parties, and, most importantly, acted as a key facilitator in the Lomé Peace Accord
(LPA)” (Belloni, 2001 as cited in Bindi & Tufekci, 2018 p.1164). These civil society groups
have continued their dedication to peace and peacebuilding through community dialogues, public
communication, and their participation in, “Economic recovery programs such as poverty
reduction strategy projects, ensuring that the country’s natural resources benefit the people,
campaigning for more women in leading positions in governments and private offices, delivering
services in areas where the government cannot afford to do so, monitoring public institutions and
processes, and supporting victims of human rights violation through legal means” (Bindi &
Tufekci, 2018 p.1164). All these efforts allowed the completion of the disarmament process and
the beginning of war crimes trials by 2004. By December 2005, UN peacekeeping forces could
be pulled out of the country.
The UN has considered the peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone a success. Although
the country is not fully developed, the goal to prevent the country from falling back into conflict
has been fulfilled. In regard to development, the country was better off 16 years after the end of
the war even though the 2014 Ebola outbreak disrupted progress. When analyzing the Human
Development Index from 1990-2018, I notice a slight improvement. This index is on a scale of
zero (not developed) to one (developed). Sierra Leone has improved from approximately 0.29 to
0.41. The HDI considers multiple aspects that determine development including health,
education, income/composition of resources, inequality, gender, poverty, work, employment and
vulnerability, human security, trade and financial flows, mobility and communication.
environmental sustainability, demography, and socio-economic sustainability.
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Human Development Index over years, retrieved from United Nations Development Programme

In order to better comprehend changes in HDI from the above chart and indicate human
development and how people are actually doing, I will discuss a few critical variables that
represent the extent to which resources are reaching the people in need: mortality rates of
children under five years old, levels of education, and life expectancy. Under-five mortality rates
offer a means to measure the medical structure of the country. Via this data, one can comprehend
if the country has the ability to take care of its citizens and provide adequate social and
humanitarian goods. Since children are the most vulnerable population, ensuring their well-being
can be associated with the prevention of certain illnesses requiring vaccination. This variable
also allows us to understand if mothers or women receive proper care before and after birth.
Lastly, the ability for children to survive or not after five years old reflect to the living conditions
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of their families. All these factors relate back to the country’s ability to provide social good and
protect its population (especially the most vulnerable ones), hence describing the country’s state
in accordance with development. The UNDP, in accordance with the data collected by the United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), analyze under-five mortality
for every 1000 live births. Level of countries’ development is associated with the number of
deaths; lower death numbers are associated with development while bigger numbers relate to
underdevelopment. In Sierra Leone, the following chart shows a tremendous improvement for
the country as the mortality rate went down from 262.1 in 1990 to 113.5 in 2016. The UN
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) aims to reduce under-five mortality rate worldwide to 25
deaths per 1000 by 2030 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Sierra Leone
numbers are very high compared to this UN objective. Nevertheless, the country has shown
tremendous improvement in this regard.

Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme
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Life expectancy is another variable that portrays the country’s ability to provide social
goods. Additionally, it is an indicator of the population's ability to ensure their well-being by
being able to have access or pay for medical expenses and have a good and balanced nutrition.
This variable also is associated with the income of the population and levels of poverty (even
though there is a specific index on income and poverty). Higher numbers in life expectancy
portray development. Sierra Leone’s life expectancy is still very low, 52.2 years in 2017.
However, compared the country’s numbers in the late 1990s, the country has improved. The
chart below shows a descendant curve between 1990 and 1996 as life expectancy went from 37.3
to 35.7. These numbers are probably due to the conflict at the time. In the ending years of the
conflict, life expectancy spiked back up.

Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme
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Another important variable indicating levels of development is the expected years of
schooling. This variable relates to the ability of the country to provide social goods, educate and
form a workforce (teachers), prevent illegal youth labor, and ensure a skilled workforce. All
these factors are detrimental to a country’s development. More years of schooling is associated
with an educated, skilled, and competitive workforce that can highly contribute to the economy
of the country. Sierra Leone has encountered a drop in years of schooling from 4.9 in 1990 to 4.6
in 1991. Since, the country has improved and as of 2017, the expected years of schooling has
increased to 9.8; this number means that most students in Sierra Leone stop going to school right
before high school. Although such a path does not produce a big number of skilled workers, the
country has tremendously ameliorated its social welfare programs.

Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme
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The HDI places Sierra Leone at number 184 in the world in regard to
development (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). This ranking places Sierra Leone
under the category of countries with low human development. Nevertheless, if peacebuilding and
its success has to be evaluated, a worldwide analysis is not the accurate indicator of the progress.
Based on the levels of improvement in Sierra Leone, as indicated by the data from HDI variables
such as under-five mortality rate, life expectancy, and expected schooling years, it can be
concluded that development has taken place in Sierra Leone after conflict.
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Chapter Five: Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire has had two civil wars in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The first
civil war occurred from 2002-2007. On September 19, 2002, there was a rebellious armed
uprising in many cities in the attempt to overthrow the president, Laurent Gbagbo (Kahn, 2003
p.17; Klaas, 2008 p.118). For four years, the country was split as the New Forces rebels (Forces
Nouvelles de la Côte d’Ivoire or FNCI) occupied the northern part of the country while the
government had control over the south even though most fighting ended in 2004. The UN
authorized French peacekeeping troops to provide order and security. The French troops that
were present before and during the conflict were considered impartial by both fighting parties as
their role was uncertain (Kahn, 2003 p.17).
After many attempts to re-establish peace, on March 4, 2007, a peace agreement was
signed, the conflict ended, and Gbago’s authority was recognized by both parties. Moreover, the
New Forces’ leader, Guillaume Soro, became prime minister as a result of this agreement
(El-Khawas and Anyu, 2014 p.47). Following this civil war, any attempt at peacebuilding was a
failure as the country experience another armed conflict approximately four years after the peace
agreement.
The Second Côte d’Ivoire civil war of 2011 was caused by political tensions in the
country due to the results of presidential elections. These elections that should have been
organized in 2005 (Gbagbo’s term ended at that time) were postponed until November 2010. The
preliminary results announced by the president of the Electoral Commission declared former
prime minister, Alassane Ouattara, winner of the presidential elections (El-Khawas and Anyu,
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2014 p.48). The ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), Gbagbo’s party, contested the results
before the Constitutional Council and claimed fraud in the northern departments that were
controlled by the rebels of the New Forces. The Constitutional Council, run by Gbagbo’s close
ally, Paul Yao N’Dre, declared the results of seven northern departments unlawful and that the
incumbent had won the elections with 51% of the vote – instead of Ouattara winning with 54%,
as reported by the Electoral Commission (BBC News, 2010; Banegas, 2011 p.461; El-Khawas
and Anyu, 2014 p.48). After the inauguration of Gbagbo, Ouattara—who was recognized as the
winner by most countries and the United Nations—organized an alternative inauguration.
The international community, including the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the
United States, and France contested the Constitutional Council’s approach, affirmed their
support for Ouattara, and called for Gbagbo to step down (Smith, 2010; Euronews, 2010; Bah,
2010 p. 605-606; Banegas, 2011 p.458). The United Nations Security Council adopted a
resolution recognizing Alassane Ouattara as winner of the elections in accordance with the
position of ECOWAS, which suspended Ivory Coast from all its decision-making bodies
(ECOWAS, 2010) and the AU which suspended the country's membership.
Negotiation attempts to resolve disputes in Côte d’Ivoire failed (El-Khawas and Anyu,
2014 p.50). On December 18, 2010, Gbagbo ordered all UN peacekeepers to leave the country
(BBC, 2010; El-Khawas and Anyu, 2014 p.49). The UN refused and the Security Council
extended the mandate of the UN Mission until June 30, 2011 (El-Khawas and Anyu, 2014 p.49).
International Organizations (IOs) reported numerous human-rights violations by both sides;
hundreds of people were killed in escalating violence between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara
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partisans and at least a million people fled, mostly from Abidjan (BBC News, 2011; Allouche
and Zadi Zadi, 2013 p.78).
On April 11, 2011, UN and French forces took military action, raided the presidential
residence, and took Gbagbo into custody (Lynch and Branigin, 2011; Banegas, 2011 p.465).
Gbagbo was taken to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. However, he was
acquitted by the court, but was given a conditional release in January 2019 because this case is
under appeal; Belgium has been designated as a host country for his detention (France 24, 2019;
Quashie-Idun, 2019; Aljazeera, 2019). Côte d’Ivoire was severely damaged by the war, and
observers asserted that it was going to be a challenge for Ouattara to rebuild the economy and
reunite Ivorians (Griffiths, 2011).
Prior to these civil wars, and based on the Polity IV authority trends figure, Côte d’Ivoire
was under an authoritarian leadership from independence (1960) to 2000. Although the country
became an economic model following independence, the 1970 crisis was a downturn as the
country became economically unstable (Klaas, 2008 p.109-110). Ironically, since the early
2000s, and in the midst of the civil wars, more democratic values were developed, starting with
Laurent Gbagbo’s elections. Following the end of hostilities, the United Nations and all actors
involved in peacebuilding have promoted stability and democratic values that have contributed to
the country’s improvement on the Polity IV index. In accordance with this positive
improvement, in 2018, the United Nations considered that its peacebuilding mission in Côte
d’Ivoire was a success and the UN Security Council ended the UN Peacekeeping mission there.
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Retrieved from Polity IV

The HDI index figure below (the UN Human Development Index) shows improvement in
the country over years (1990-2018) especially after the end of both civil wars. Even though the
country is ranked 170th on the current global development index, many efforts were done to
improve Côte d’Ivoire.
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Human Development Index over years, retrieved from United Nations Development Programme

The HDI index can further be understood by evaluating specific aspects portraying
development including under-five mortality rates, life expectancy, and expected years of
schooling. In Côte d’Ivoire, under-five mortality rates have tremendously decreased from 150.9
in 1990 to 91.8 in 2016. During both civil wars, these numbers were over 100 deaths; such a
reduction may suppose that more efforts have been put into protecting children, mothers, and
providing better nutrition and healthcare. These social factors are relevant to the government’s
performance in ensuring social or population’s welfare and correlate with development. These
numbers are encoded for every 1000 deaths and the numbers are still high. Côte d’Ivoire has not
fully recovered from the damages caused by these conflicts, however, the country’s ability to
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ensure infant and maternal care is improving (in accordance with the numbers in the figure
below).

Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme HDI

When it comes to life expectancy, the figure below shows a slight U or V curve. From
1990 to 2002, life expectancy went down from 52.5 to 46.6. After this period, the UN and the
international community undertook efforts to ensure stability in the country, and these numbers
spiked back up from 46.9 in 2003 to 54.1 in 2017. The life expectancy figure does not show a
point where these numbers have been above 60. Although there is improvement, these numbers
still show lack of development in the country. Hence, we see the complexity of the Ivorian case.
Improvement in regard to development is noticeable, however the country is only slightly better
off. The continuance of poverty, unfortunately, may drive discontent and lead to a resurgence of
conflict, depending on the political environment.
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Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme HDI

The last indicator of development examined was expecting years of schooling. The
results below were surprising as many African country look up to Côte d’Ivoire for high level
education. The figure shows improvement in expected years of schooling: 5.9 in 1990 and 9 in
2017 (with a slight drop from 6.5 in 1997 to 6.3 in 1998). As most of the population stops
schooling before high school, it is hard for the country to have a competing skilled force that
would contribute to the economy and the country’s development.
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Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme

Côte d’Ivoire is a complex case. The peacebuilding mission is deemed successful because
the country has not returned to war. However, there is a serious concern that the country may fall
back into conflict. Since 2011, the country has struggled to recover economically. Moreover, the
West African region has been shaken by many political changes in Benin, Burkina Faso,
Senegal, etc. Moreover, terrorism in the region especially with Mali and Nigeria has led to an
increased sense of insecurity in the region. These domestic, regional, and international factors
contribute to instability and development in Côte d’Ivoire. Hence, in this thesis, the mission in
Côte d’Ivoire will be considered a tentative success as stability has not been fully established and
there are still risks of conflict recurrence.
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Chapter Six: Central African Republic (CAR)

From 2004-2007, the Central African Republic underwent a civil war: the Bush War. A
peace agreement was signed between the president, François Bozizé, and the rebels to end the
war (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). In November 2012, a new rebel coalition, the Séléka,
took over multiple towns in the northern and central regions of the country, claiming that the
president did not abide by the rules established in the peace agreements. In January 2013,
another peace deal was signed between the government and this new coalition; this agreement
required power sharing between both parties. Peace was reinstated momentary. Later, the deal
was not respected and by March 2013, rebels took over the capital city and the president fled the
country (Shoichet, Yan, & Karikari-apau, 2013; Polgreen, 2013). The rebel leader, Michel
Djotodia, declared himself president. The hostilities continued and there were warning signs of
genocide as the Séléka (Muslims) were fighting the anti-balaka militias (Christians) (BBC News,
2013; Karlsrud, 2015 p.48; CAR in Brief, 2014; Clarke, 2014 p.8-9). Many people became
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and many more sought refuge in neighboring countries.
The new Séléka government lost its unity after gaining power. Hence, in September
2013, Djotodia disbanded Séléka, but many rebels refused to disarm and became known as
ex-Séléka and out of government control. In January 2014, Michael Djotodia resigned as part of
a deal negotiated at a regional summit in Chad (BBC News, 2014). He was replaced by
Catherine Samba-Panza who aimed to bring peace and all parties together during her time as
interim president. In July 2014, ex-Séléka factions and anti-Balaka representatives signed a
ceasefire agreement in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. By the end of 2014, the country was
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divided: the anti-Balaka took control of the south and west while the ex-Séléka groups controlled
the north and east. In a country with a population of about 5 million people, more than 1.1
million fled their homes (Bloomberg, 2017). Even after the 2016 elections of a new president,
Faustin Toudaré, there are still ongoing tensions in the country.
Since CAR’s independence in 1960, the country has been ruled by authoritarian regimes
(according to the Polity IV figure below). The only instances where democratic values have been
incorporated date back to 1990, especially with a huge spike in 1992. After this period, the
country went back to being governed under authoritarian regimes. Moreover, this country has
been subject to many coups and political instabilities that have negatively affected development.
Based on the HDI figure, CAR has not significantly improved since independence. The country
had slight trends of development that were interrupted by the 2012 civil war. Since 2012, there
was another wave of development as the country has been receiving assistance from the
international community, especially from the UN peacebuilding mission. Nevertheless, the
country is still at the bottom of the list in the global HDI as it is ranked number 188 (according to
the human development report).
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Retrieved from Polity IV

Human Development Index over years, retrieved from United Nations Development Programme
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To further examine development in CAR, I considered under-five mortality rate, life
expectancy, and expected years of schooling. Under-five mortality rate has decreased from 173.6
in 1990 to 123.6 in 2016. There is a curve in regard to life expectancy as the figure shows a
decrease between 1990 (48.8) and 2002 (43.7) followed by an uptake in years. Since 2002, the
country’s life expectancy has increased to 52.9 years as recorded in 2017. The last variable,
expected years of schooling, is another where improvement can be noticed. Although between
1990 and 1994, the number of years people were expected to stay in school dropped from 5.2 to
4.4. CAR has since improved in this regard as according to the United Nations Development
Programme HDI; CAR expected years of schooling was 7.2 in 2017.

Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme HDI
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Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme

Data retrieved from United Nations Development Programme
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All above figures show improvement in CAR’s ability to provide for its population.
However, such improvement has not allowed the country to undergo a thorough development
process.
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Chapter Seven: Work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Fund, and UN
Family

As mentioned in the definition section, chapter two, the UN Peacebuilding Commission
has set priorities to ensure effective peacebuilding, including supporting basic safety and
security, political processes, basic services, restoration of core government functions, and
economic revitalization. This chapter will evaluate peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone, Côte
d’Ivoire, and Central African Republic, taking into consideration these priorities to foster better
and more effective peacebuilding missions. In order to evaluate the work of peacebuilders and
patterns that foster or decrease development, specific aspects of peacebuilding, including
finance, elections, and youth development will be examined.

Financing Peacebuilding:
Sierra Leone was one of the largest recipients of peacebuilding funds (United Nations
Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Since 2007, the country has received $52.2 million in assistance for
a wide range of projects, including assistance to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Anti-Corruption Commission, assistance for victims’ reparations, and dealing with political party
conflict mediation and codes of conduct. Moreover, the funds supported transition from the
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to the United
Nations Country Team (UNCT) after the third successive round of peaceful elections in the
country and the government’s launch of its Agenda for Prosperity (AfP) for social and economic
development for 2013-18 (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Additionally, issues
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concerning political dialogue, security sector reforms, the strengthening of human rights
institutions, and conflict prevention have also been addressed (United Nations Peacebuilding
Fund, 2019).
Project Name/ID

Focus

Period

Budget

Support to Security Sector
reforms in Sierra Leone to
build effective and
accountable institutions for
increased citizen security
PBF/IRF-77

The project helps the
Government of Sierra
Leone to ensure that
democratic governance
of the security sector
on the basis of the rule
of law is recognized as
crucial to securing
peace and sustainable
development.

October 2013December 2015

$2,780,000 UNDP

UNIPSIL Support to Sierra
Leone’s Constitutional
Review Process
PBF/IRF-72

The preparatory
September 2013–
project supports the
April 2014
Sierra Leone’s
Constitutional Review
Process by building the
capacity of non-state
actors including
political parties to
contribute
substantively to the
process, and will
complement the
UNDP-funded
outreach phase of the
exercise.

$298,061

Developing national
mechanisms and capacities
for conflict prevention and
peace preservation in
Sierra Leone
PBF/IRF-94

The project aims to
strengthen conflict
resolutions mechanism
in Sierra Leone
building on the
existing systems and
filling the potential
gaps due to the
withdrawal of
UNIPSIL by

$1,515,000 UNDP
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August 2014 –
February 2016

RUNOS

UNDPA

supporting and
strengthening national
stakeholders to
institutionalize the
systems for preserving
peace through an early
warning and response
system, and to create a
culture of dialogue to
resolve political
differences.
Support efforts to
consolidate key human
rights activities in
partnership with then
Human Rights
Commission of Sierra
Leone
PBF/IRF-95

The aims to fill a
June 2014 –
critical human rights
December 2015
monitoring gaps left by
UNIPSIL transition
and aims to strengthen
the Human Rights
Council of Sierra
Leone’s human rights
monitoring capacity
especially to address
the lack of compliance
of business practices
with international
Human Right
standards and to
protect and promote
awareness of rights of
women, girls and
disabled persons.

$525,000

OHCH
R

Retrieved from UN Peacebuilding Fund

Success of the peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone can be determined not only by the
availability of funds but also by the variety of on the ground activities to establish peace, prevent
conflict recurrence, and promote development. In this country, the war ended in 2002. However,
the UN and many other organizations have continued to conduct peacebuilding missions even a
decade after. Although development was interrupted by the Ebola crisis of 2014-2016, the UN
has considered Sierra Leone one of their most successful missions.
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Côte d’Ivoire has received $33.5 million for peacebuilding since 2008 (United Nations
Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). This funding has allowed the restoration of state authority in the
west and Abidjan, population security, and provided identity documentation to 401,958 adults
and children (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). More than 180,000 individuals have
been able to gain access to key governmental services as a result of their new recognized status
and citizenship (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). The funding also contributed to
establishing durable solutions to the repatriated population, birth registrations, and provided
mediation in conflict zones as trust has been restored between the population and the providers
of state services (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). The fund also supported
reconciliation approaches especially by bringing the work of the Commission of Truth and
Reconciliation closer to the population, fostering dialogue, and reducing tensions in the lead-up
to the elections (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Five million dollars was spent on a
project to strengthen peaceful co-existence and security via workshops and dialogue activities in
the electoral period between ONUCI and key stakeholders, including the Electoral Independent
Commission (CEI), political parties, youth and women (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund,
2019). The project also established a Women’s Situation Room, based on the positive experience
of the Case de Veille in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019).
Moreover, training and awareness raising activities on “crowd management” to the Security and
Defense forces contributed to containing the outbreak of violence during electoral campaigns
(United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019).
Project Name/ID

Focus

Period

PBF/IRF-91: IRF
Support project to

This project aims at
empowering women in

2014-2015 $1,500,000 UNFPA, UN
Women, and UNDP
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Budget

RUNOS

women’s community
initiatives in favor of
the consolidation of
peace in CI

conflict prevention and
resolution mechanisms
within their communities in
the areas affected by
conflict (Western region
and Abidjan)

PBF/IRF-60 IRF
Support to the
development of a
national strategy on
SSR in CdI

This project supports the
Government in the design
and implementation of a
national SSR and DDR
policy

2012-2015 $550,000

PBF/CIV/B-3
Support to the
reinforcement of
trust, coexistence,
and security
stabilization for calm
elections

This projects aims at
supporting activities
conducive to peaceful and
democratic elections
including: 1) strengthening
trust between the SDF and
the population; 2) support
the implementation of the
recommendations of the
Truth and Reconciliation
Commission; 3) support
dialogue and trust amongst
political parties, youth and
women

2015-2017 $5,000,000 UN Women, UNDP,
UNESCO

PBF/CIV/A-3
Support to the
prevention et the
peaceful
management of
conflicts

This project aims at
2015-2017 $3,850,000 UN Women, UNDP,
strengthening local
FAO, UNFPA
mechanisms for peaceful
resolution of local conflicts
and in particular land
conflicts through social
cohesion and trust building
between the population and
the local authorities

PBF/CIV/E-2
Support to the
registration of births
and deaths
considering
deadlines and civil
society reform

This project supports the
2015-2017 $2,000,000 UNHCR, UNFPA,
state function in the area of
UNICEF
civil rights and in particular
the distribution birth and
death certificates
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DPKO

PBF/CIV/H-2
Secretariat support to the
Support to the
Joint Steering Committee
planning,
and M&E function
coordination, update,
and evaluation to
making into effect
the Peacebuilding
Priority Plan

2015-2017 $1,150,000 UNDP

Retrieved from UN Peacebuilding Fund with French to English translation in first row
In Côte d’Ivoire, the Peacebuilding Fund’s contributions have been necessary and
impactful in reassuring political stability and civil society. The above results show that more
emphasis has been put into elections; however, there are less activities dedicated to long lasting
development projects.
Since 2008, the Peacebuilding Fund has contributed $48 million in efforts to ensure
Peacebuilding in CAR (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Thirty-four million dollars of
this amount was disbursed prior to the relapse into violence of 2013 (United Nations
Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Hence, since the 2012 conflict, $14 million was spent on
peacebuilding activities in CAR (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Moreover, most of
this money, since 2014, was spent on restructuring, reestablishing, and reconciling the country’s
police and gendarmerie; as shown in the below table by the Peacebuilding Fund, approximately
$11 million of the $14 million was spent in this regard.
Project Name/ID

Focus

Period

PBF/IRF-79:
Urgent reestablishment
of functioning capacities
of the police and
gendarmerie in Bangui

Support to the
urgent
rehabilitation of all
police (8) and
gendarmerie (3)
stations in Bangui

2014-2016 $ 2,496,718 UNDPUNDPA

PBF/IRF-88:

Support to the

2014-2016
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Budget

RUNOS

UNDPCARMPTFUN

Support to the payment
of salaries of the police
and gendarmerie

payment of salaries
of police and
gendarmerie in
collaboration with
the World Bank and
support to a
mechanism of
police and
gendarmerie
compliance to the
Secretary-General
Human Rights Due
Diligence Policy

$ 5,762,600 CARMPTFGvt

PBF/IRF-103:
Support to the process of
national reconciliation
for a durable peace in
CAR

Support to
2014-2016 $ 2,709,306 UNDPUNFPA
reconciliation and
political dialogue,
including
preparations for the
Bangui Forum and
the establishment of
a network of
mediators

Retrieved from UN Peacebuilding Fund with slight French to English translation in first row

In CAR, most of the funding provided has served to reinstate peace by focusing on
activities such as policing and reconciliation. In addition to the above funding on police related
issues, in 2014, the Peacebuilding Support Office approved $2.5 million to support voluntary
relocation of ex-Séleka combatants from camps in Bangui to their communities of origin or
choice; receiving communities also received financial support from the office (United Nations
Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Hence, more than 800 ex-combatants and family members were
voluntarily relocated (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). As of June 2015,
approximately 75% of those who volunteered to be relocated have remained disengaged from
fighting (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Moreover, in December 2014, the Fund
allocated $2.7 million to aid reconciliation and political dialogue efforts in CAR (United Nations
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Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). The project, co-financed by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the Peacebuilding Fund supported the organization of the Bangui
Forum that took place in May 2015 (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). This forum
marked the first time in the country’s history that a national dialogue included locals (referring to
non-citizens of Bangui, the capital); this was an important step in repairing citizens’ confidence
in and legitimacy of governing institutions (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Lastly,
new PBF support to CAR is focusing on the redeployment of state authority, community
violence reduction, and catalytic support for the strengthening of political parties and elections
(United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019).
Regardless of these efforts to re-establish peace, CAR is still struggling with
development. The above approaches to prevent recurrence of conflict suggest that peacekeeping
activities are still needed. However, most of the peacekeepers have left the country. The
emphasis is being put on rebuilding local police, hence, there should be an additional force to
ensure peace while this process is still ongoing. It was a miscalculation by the UN to pull out
peacekeepers early. Of course, there are multiple reasons why the UN undertook this approach
and one of them may be the availability of funds. Since more funds are needed to ensure
development, CAR’s government and the World Bank have set a five year National Recovery
and Peacebuilding Plan, 2017-2021, which has an estimated cost of $3.161 billion (World Bank
Document, 2016 p.XI).
Compared to Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, CAR has received less funding ($14
million) since 2012 as prior peacebuilding funds ($34 million) were used ineffectively and did
not prevent the relapse to conflict. As contributions in peacebuilding activities decrease, the UN
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has to be more strategic with its expenditures. Reinstating police and funding reconciliation
approaches are great ways to ensuring peace. However, the amount of money spent on political
reconstruction, elections, and youth activities are as important. The following sections will
analyze the effectiveness of the money spent to promote political parties, elections, and youth
activities have contributed to development.

Elections
In all three case studies, there was a pattern in regard to peacebuilding: elections. In all
three countries, presidential elections immediately followed after the end of hostilities or, as in
Côte d'Ivoire, was one of the main causes of conflict. In Sierra Leone, the leadership did not
change after 2002; Ahmad Tejan Kabbah remained president until the 2007 elections. After these
elections, two more presidential elections have been held in 2012 and 2018.
After conflict, the UN has made sure to re-establish security first before the country has
engaged in the process of presidential elections. The UN ensured security with the support of its
peacekeeping forces (the largest ever of any UN operation) who stayed in Sierra Leone until
December 31, 2005 (Pemagbi, 2006). By this time, Sierra Leone had become stable as the
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) was a success (Pemagbi, 2006).
Moreover, the country has developed democratic values and processes with the work of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. Consequently, the 2007 elections
were the result of effective peacebuilding and contributed to the political stability of Sierra
Leone, especially by considering and including youth and women in the political process.
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In Côte d’Ivoire, the 2010 presidential elections were the cause of the civil war. Since
then, the country has had one presidential election in 2015, in accordance with the country’s
five-year mandate policy. Hence, the next elections will be held in 2020. After the 2010 elections
and President Ouattara took over, the UN peacebuilding activities continued. As a reminder,
Cote d’Ivoire is considered a tentative success.
There are still political tensions in Côte d’Ivoire, however, the country has managed to
prevent a recurrence of war since 2011. Unlike in Sierra Leone where DDR was completed and
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was successfully established, in Côte d’Ivoire,
elections were held while these activities were still ongoing. More peacebuilding projects,
including women’s programs, conflict prevention mechanisms, civil rights projects and many
more are still ongoing. Hence, it is hard for the country to ensure development while stability is
not fully recovered. In the moment where UN funds are limited and more funds are needed to
promote development, security, and stability, the Peacebuilding Fund provided, in 2014, a
three-year $12 million grant aiming to focus on the pre- and post- 2015 election period (United
Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). Even though the country and the UN are fulfilling political
needs by maintaining a consistent leadership; nevertheless, elections money which could be used
in other ways to build development projects.
Central African Republic has been struggling with political stability. Since the 2012 civil
war and after Bozizé fled the country, CAR has had four presidents and only the current
president, Touadéra, was elected. Peacebuilding efforts in CAR have only focused on policing
and relocation. Even though this approach suggests that security and safety are the priorities,
elections (which can either jeopardize or establish a country’s stability) have been considered an
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alternative in an instance where the country was very fragile. In 2015, The PBF contributed $1
million towards elections (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2019). However, no real efforts
have been noticed in regard to development in CAR.
Are elections an immediate concern in ensuring peace? Based on the above cases,
elections are more likely to ensure long lasting political stability if the country’s structures,
safety, and security are re-established first. Conducting elections during peacebuilding or
peacekeeping missions constitute a financial burden on the Peacebuilding Fund. As it was in
Côte d’Ivoire, new voter registrations had to be made as populations lost their identification
documents and had relocated. This process can take a long time and the funds that were used to
prepare and conduct elections could be used to promote activities that would contribute to
immediate and long-lasting results that would benefit populations and the country. Yet, we must
remember that free and fair elections are part of peacebuilding and stability. Still, elections
should be postponed and only held once security and stability operations have been a success as
it was in the case of Sierra Leone.

Youth activities/employment
Analyzing projects aiming to engage youths, people of ages 15 to 35, allow
understanding the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts. By targeting youth activities, I will be
able to examine the ability of peacebuilding operations to impact local populations, create
employment, demobilize, disarm, reintegrate, build human development, and engage populations
into the political and economic processes.
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In Sierra Leone, approximately a third of the population are considered youths (Joint
Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone, 2010 p.1). Of this group, and as of 2010, more
than 50% were underemployed or unemployed, illiterate, and unskilled (Joint Response to Youth
Employment in Sierra Leone, 2010 p.1; Executive Summary, 2010 p.6). According to the Joint
Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone (2010, p,1), such large numbers of unemployed
youths constitute a potential source of insecurity given their vulnerability to recruitment into
criminal and violent activities; this was demonstrated in March 2009 and February 2010 political
violence events in Freetown led by unemployed youth. Hence, UN family, German Development
Cooperation (GTZ), the World Bank, and the European Union (EU) have all come together in a
three-year Joint Response to youth employment and worked with the government to tackle this
challenge (Joint Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone, 2010 p.1). This program aimed
to create 106,000 jobs between 2010 and 2012 including Labor Intensive Public Works, Private
Sector and Agro-Business Jobs, Skills Development and Employment Support, Youth
Empowerment, Research on the Situation of Youth, and Sector Planning and Coordination (Joint
Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone, 2010 p.I & 1). The estimated cost for this
program was $46 million (Joint Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone, 2010 p.I).
Instead of being supply oriented, this new approach consisted of training youths and building
enterprise start-ups without creating any demand in order to foster economic growth and develop
infrastructure (Joint Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone, 2010 p.3). The issue of
unemployment is still a threat in Sierra Leone (Report of the Visit of the Peacebuilding
Commission to Sierra Leone,2013 p.4 & 5). However, this approach to integration has
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contributed to the decrease of youth led violence while creating the opportunity to promote
development for the country and future prospects for its youths.
Just like Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire was also struggling to address high rates of youth
unemployment. Young people constituted 77.3 percent of the Ivorian population and more than
two third of them were unemployed as of 2016 (Pazisnewende Kaboré, 2016 p.1 & 2). There
have been growing concerns that unemployment has been contributing to the rise of violent
extremism in the country. Hence to combat unemployment, Pazisnewende Kaboré (2016 p. 3)
believed that entrepreneurship was one of the best solutions as the public sector could not absorb
all the labor force, there is demand for entrepreneurship as it could lead to positive agency and
societal inclusion. Even though Côte d’Ivoire has been progressing in other areas, its youth
situation is still an area in need of great attention in order to guarantee safety in the country.
Lastly, in Central African Republic, youth were the most targeted and affected population
during hostilities that took place in the country. As of 2017, 75% of CAR’s population was under
35 years old and 40% of these young people contributed to the civil wars (Kitengue, 2017). Since
this population may still have grievances that can be detrimental to the security of the nation,
there have been many approaches to include youths as part of the peacebuilding process. Youths
have participated in activities regarding negotiation, conflict analysis, social cohesion, inclusive
national dialogue, reconciliation, entrepreneurship, peace promotion, and mediation (Kitengue,
2017). Moreover, in an attempt to rebuild trust among youths (Christians and Muslims), the
United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA) started programs aiming to train and educate them
about human rights and health or sexual related matters (Shrivastava, Shrivastava, & Ramasamy,
2017). Additionally, many youth organizations such as Bird of Peace have formed to enhance
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respect for human rights, good governance, rule of law, and capacity-building through peace
education programs. Other youth organizations in CAR already engaged in designing, planning
and implementing programs and activities to resolve conflicts and promote peace (Kitengue,
2017). Even though literacy rates in CAR are really low, many youths have been able to learn
from their participation in the peacebuilding process.
Furthermore, youth employment is another vital component in conflict transformation and
a matter of great importance for CAR and its government. Thus, the national labor-intensive
public works program (THIMO) was launched by the government and funded by the World
Bank (Kitengue, 2017). In this program, state-owned companies employed youth, without
considering their background or education (Kitengue, 2017). THIMO became an important tool
in violence and unemployment reduction, stability enhancement, and the promotion of social
cohesion in local communities (Kitengue, 2017). Kitengue (2017) asserted that, “Once youth
groups previously involved in violent conflict are transformed and empowered to take ownership
of youth conflict transformation plans or programs, hostilities and tensions will subside and
recovery will begin.” Even though the country is still politically and economically struggling,
youth progress is a positive aspect that can help and foster growth in other areas.
Youth unemployment and participation have been some of the many factors that have
impacted peacebuilding in the countries analyzed in this paper. Based on the above findings, it
can be implied that efforts to reduce unemployment constitute a positive aspect to ensuring
security and safety after conflict. Moreover, more participation of youth in the peacebuilding
process prevents them from engaging into violence while promoting the need to further efforts
concerning negotiation, mediation, education and many more. The UN work in Sierra Leone has

54

been a success even though the country’s development process was disrupted by the Ebola
outbreak of 2014. In CAR, many activities have been conducted to foster youth participation.
Lastly, more efforts are still needed in Côte d’Ivoire.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations

Peacebuilding has been conceptualized as the process of establishing durable peace and
preventing war recurrence in post-conflict situations. The United Nations and its Peacebuilding
Commission have set priorities to ensure effectiveness of peacebuilding missions. These
priorities consist of ensuring safety, security, supporting political processes, providing basic
services, restoring core government, and promoting economic revitalization. The UN, the
Peacebuilding Commission and its Support Office along with UNDP and others have conducted
peacebuilding activities in accordance with these priorities. Programs fostering reconciliation,
the creation of local and societal structures for peace, inclusive institutions, good governance,
and economic development were designed and implemented. Developing and underdeveloped
countries are the main recipients of these programs. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of
peacebuilding missions, this thesis responded to the question: to what extent do peacebuilding
operations contribute to the stability of underdeveloped and developing countries in post-conflict
situations? In accordance with the literature, I hypothesized that peacebuilding missions are
necessary yet frequently fail to respond to the long-term political, social, and economic stability
of underdeveloped and developing countries in post-conflict situations. After analyzing three
specific cases (Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Central African Republic), it can be concluded
that there are multiple factors that affect peacebuilding success. It is hard to assert that
peacebuilding has failed to ensure long-term development as every mission is different, and the
work of the peacebuilding community has positively affected development even in instances
where their impact is less noticeable. This conclusion derives from the analysis of case studies’
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data concerning the human development index, under-five mortality rates, life expectancy,
expected years of schooling, peacebuilding finances, elections, and youth activities and
employment. In Sierra Leone, the peacebuilding mission allowed the country to re-establish
stability and ensure youth development and reintegration before conducting elections. This
mission has been considered one of the most successful missions conducted by the UN as, in
addition to stability, the country was able to pursue development, even though it was later
interrupted by the Ebola crisis. In Côte d’Ivoire, the peacebuilding mission was considered a
tentative success: even though peacekeepers left the country and elections have been held, there
are still tensions in the country that may be detrimental to peace. Yet, as a caution, there have
been less efforts to ensure youth reintegration. Hence, many youngsters joined violent extremist
groups that could threaten the country’s current stability. In the last case study, Central African
Republic, the UN has been struggling to re-establish peace, safety, and security. Many
approaches have been taken to prevent conflict relapse, including focusing on policing, elections,
and youth participation into the peacebuilding process. In all three cases, evidence shows that the
work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission has fostered development. Even if these countries
are still at the bottom of the HDI index, the work of the PBC has allowed them to improve,
compare to the period before and during conflicts.
In carrying out the research for this thesis, I discovered that there have been studies
undertaken to analyze approaches for improving peacebuilding effectiveness. The Progress
Report of the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, cited in the literature review section, chapter
three, the UN has improved on many of its areas of work to ensure successful peacebuilding
missions. The report stated that improvements were necessary in regard to planning, strategy,
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and addressing immediate national priorities with a common approach. In accordance with these
recommendations, PBC priorities, and the work evaluated in this thesis, here are some of the
recommendations that may be necessary to improve peacebuilding:
-

Set priorities by first emphasizing safety and security, providing basic services,
supporting political processes (including elections), restoring the core of the government,
and promoting economic revitalization.

-

Safety and security should be established considering all parties’ needs, immediate
priorities, and DDR especially for youths.

-

The provision of basic services would include restoration of infrastructure, relocation and
integration of people’s needs, and a high engagement of the population in this process.

-

Re-establishment of political parties and elections can be conducted, if necessary, in
accordance with the success of previous processes. Elections can only be held if there is
stability.

-

Acknowledge and put more emphasis on the role of youth integration and create training
programs, jobs, promote entrepreneurship, and education programs that would promote
the creation of a skilled forced and foster economic development.
These recommendations are supposed to complement the current work of the PBC and all

actors involved in Peacebuilding. Moreover, they have to be evaluated or accomplished in
relation to on the ground priorities. Specific activities targeting locals can only be designed
depending on the mission. The work of the PBC has contributed to ensure peace and stability
worldwide and my hope is that this work will contribute to the establishment of more successful
missions.

58

References
Aljazeera (February 6, 2019). Ivory Coast's ex-president Laurent Gbagbo released to Belgium.
Retrieved from
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/ivory-coast-president-laurent-gbagbo-releasedbelgium-190206061604107.html
Allouche, J., & Zadi Zadi, P. A. (2013). The dynamics of restraint in Côte d’Ivoire. IDS Bulletin,
44(1), 72–86. Retrieved from
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1111/1759-5436.12008
Bah, A. B. (2010). Democracy and civil war: Citizenship and peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire.
African Affairs, 109(437), 597–615. Retrieved from
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1093/afraf/adq046
Banegas, R. (2011). Post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire: The gbonhi war. African Affairs,
110(440), 457–468. Retrieved from
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1093/afraf/adr025
BBC News (December 3, 2010). Ivory Coast poll overturned: Gbagbo declared winner.
Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11913832
BBC News (December 23, 2010). Gbagbo orders peacekeepers to leave Ivory Coast. Retrieved
from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12028263
BBC News (January 11, 2014). CAR interim President Michel Djotodia resigns. Retrieved from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25683279
BBC News (March 31, 2011). Ivory Coast: Ouattara forces surround Gbagbo in Abidjan.
Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12925705

59

BBC News (November 4, 2013). UN warning over Central African Republic genocide risk.
Retrieved from
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-24800682/un-warning-over-central-african-re
public-genocide-risk
Bindi, I. T., & Tufekci, O. (2018). Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: A Critical Exploration.
Journal of Asian & African Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.), 53(8), 1158–1172.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1177/0021909618776427
Bloomberg (November 21, 2017). Concert blast shows Central African Republic religious rift.
Retrieved from
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/blast-at-concert-shows-central-afr
ican-republic-s-religious-rift
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and
peace-keeping : report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the
summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations.
CAR in Brief. (2014). Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social & Cultural Series, 51(2),
20029B–20029C. https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2014.05564.x
Central Intelligence Agency (April 3, 2019). Africa: Central African Republic archived. CIA
World Factbook. Retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html
Clarke, K. (2014). As religious clashes continue calls for partition increase. America, 210(16),
8–9. Retrieved from

60

http://search.ebscohost.com.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9
5869074&site=ehost-live
ECOWAS (December 7, 2010). Final communique on the extraordinary session of the authority
of heads of state and government on Cote d’Ivoire. Resolution N°: 188/2010, Abuja,
Nigeria. Retrieved from
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=188&lang=en&annee=2010
El-Khawas, M. A., & Anyu, J. N. (2014). Côte d’Ivoire: Ethnic Turmoil and Foreign
Intervention. Africa Today, 61(2), 41–55.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.2979/africatoday.61.2.41
Euronews (December, 4 2010). Ivory Coast's Gbagbo defies world leaders. Retrieved from
https://www.euronews.com/2010/12/04/ivory-coast-s-gbagbo-defies-world-leaders
Executive Summary (2010). Retrieved from the Peacebuilding Commission Documents.
France 24 (February 2, 2019). ICC orders conditional release of ex-Ivory Coast leader Gbagbo.
Retrieved from
https://www.france24.com/en/20190201-icc-orders-conditional-release-ex-ivory-coast-le
ader-laurent-gbagbo
Fulcher, J. (2012). Learning Peace: Progressive impacts of peace education in peacebuilding.
Social Alternatives, 31(4), 40–42. Retrieved from
http://ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&
db=a9h&AN=89131664&site=ehost-live

61

Gberie, L. (2010). Africa and international criminal justice: lessons from the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. African Security Review, 19(4), 31–47.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1080/10246029.2010.539809
Griffiths, T. (April 11, 2011). The war is over — but Ouattara's struggle has barely begun. The
Guardian. London. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/11/ivory-coast-gbagbo-ouattara-e
conomic-crisis
Jackson, P. (2015). Power, security, and justice in postconflict Sierra Leone. Air & Space Power
Journal: Afrique et Francophonie, 6(1), 38–52. Retrieved from
http://search.ebscohost.com.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=1
08474260&site=ehost-live
Joint Response to Youth Employment in Sierra Leone (2010). Retrieved from the Peacebuilding
Commission Documents.
Kahn, J. (2003). No Way Out. New Republic, 229(21), 16–18. Retrieved from
http://search.ebscohost.com.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=1
1419739&site=ehost-live
Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates
for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. Third World
Quarterly, 36(1), 40–54.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016
Kitengue, F. T (October 12, 2017). Youth engagement in conflict transformation in the Central
African Republic. Reliefweb. Retrieved from

62

https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/youth-engagement-conflict-transform
ation-central-african-republic
Klaas, B. (2008). From miracle to nightmare: An institutional analysis of development failures in
Côte d’Ivoire. Africa Today, 55(1), 108–126.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.2979/AFT.2008.55.1.108
Lynch, C. & Branigin, W. (April 11, 2011). Ivory Coast strongman arrested after French forces
intervene. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ivory-coast-strongman-arrested-after-french-forc
es-intervene/2011/04/11/AFOBaeKD_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e34501384
d03
McNerney, M.J. (2006). Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a model or a muddle?
Parameters. Retrieved from
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/05winter/mcnerney.pdf
Mizuta, S. (2008). Development activities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): How can
they fill the gap between stability and development? Conference Papers -- International
Studies Association, 1 –13.
Note to Secretary-General (February 8, 2010) as part of the Secretary-General letter of February,
18 2010. Accessed through the Ban Ki-moon papers project: City College of New York,
not available to the public yet.
Pazisnewende Kaboré, F. (October 2016). Entrepreneurship, youth employment, and violent
extremism in Côte d’Ivoire. The Southern Voices Network: Research Paper. Wilson
Center Africa Program.

63

Peacebuilding Initiative (2008). History. International Association for Humanitarian Policy and
Conflict Research. R
 etrieved from
http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index34ac.html
Pemagbi, J.R. (February 27, 2016). Invitation to the Peacebuilding Commission to operate in
Sierra Leone. Retrieved from the Peacebuilding Commission Documents.
Polgreen, L. (March 25, 2013). Leader of Central African Republic fled to Cameroon, official
says. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/world/africa/leader-of-central-african-republic-fran
cois-bozize-is-in-cameroon.html
Polity IV (2014). Authority trends, 1960-2013: Central African Republic. Retrieved from
https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/cen2.htm
Polity IV (2014). Authority trends, 1960-2013: Côte d’Ivoire. Retrieved from
https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ivo2.htm
Polity IV (2014). Authority trends, 1961-2013: Sierra Leone. Retrieved from
https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/sie2.htm
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of
conflict (June 28, 2010). Accessed through the Ban Ki-moon papers project: City College
of New York, not available to the public yet.
Quashie-Idun, S. (January 15, 2019). Former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo freed by
International Criminal Court. CNN. R
 etrieved from
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/15/africa/laurent-gbagbo-acquitted-by-icc/index.html

64

Reilly, B. (2013). Political parties and post-conflict peacebuilding. Civil Wars, 15, 88–104.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1080/13698249.2013.850883
Report of the Secretary-General on women’s participation in peacebuilding (September 27,
2010). Accessed through the Ban Ki-moon papers project: City College of New York, not
available to the public yet.
Report of the visit of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone (February 14-20, 2013).
Executive Summary. Retrieved from the Peacebuilding Commission Documents.
Schocken, C. (2002). The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and recommendations.
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 20(2), 436. Retrieved from
http://ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&
db=a9h&AN=7516265&site=ehost-live
Shoichet, C.E., Yan, H., and Karikari-apau, N. (March 25, 2013). Central African Republic
president flees capital amid violence, official says. CNN. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/24/world/africa/central-african-republic-unrest/index.html
Shamsie, Y. (2008). Haiti: Appraising two rounds of peacebuilding using a poverty reduction
lens. Civil Wars, 10(4), 413–430.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1080/13698240802354490
Shrivastava, S. R., Shrivastava, P. S., & Ramasamy, J. (2017). Mobilizing youth population to
spread peace in the conflict-affected regions of Central Africa. Annals of Tropical
Medicine & Public Health, 10(5), 1394–1395.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.4103/1755-6783.196755

65

Smith, D. (December 22, 2010). Ivory Coast: Death squads on the rise as civil war looms. The
Guardian. UK. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/22/ivory-coast-death-squads
Subedi, D. B. (2013). “Pro-peace entrepreneur” or “conflict profiteer”? Critical perspective on
the Private Sector and peacebuilding in Nepal. Peace & Change, 38(2), 181–206.
https://doi-org.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/10.1111/pech.12011
United Nations Development Programme (Accessed April 4, 2019). Human Development
Reports: Sierra Leone. Retrieved from
http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SLE#
United Nations Peacebuilding (accessed February 18, 2019). Peacebuilding Commission:
Mandate. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/mandate
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (Accessed April 29, 2019). Central African Republic.
Retrieved from http://www.unpbf.org/countries/central-african-republic/
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (Accessed April 29, 2019). Côte d’Ivoire. Retrieved from
http://www.unpbf.org/countries/cote-divoire/
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (Accessed April 29, 2019). Sierra Leone. Retrieved
http://www.unpbf.org/countries/sierra-leone/
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (accessed February 2, 2019). What is peacebuilding?
Retrieved from http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/
UN, World Bank, GDC, IFAD and EU (December 2, 2010). Strategies and lessons learned on
sustainable reintegration and job creation. Retrieved from the Peacebuilding Commission
Documents.

66

World Bank Document (2016). Central African Republic: National Recovery and Peacebuilding
Plan 2017–21. Retrieved from
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/817461516999933538/pdf/122994-WP-PUB
LIC-CAR-RPBA.pdf

67

